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Remarks on the modernization of Japan and 
   Turkey in the 18t'' and 19t' centuries
Selcuk ESENBEL
   Comparisons of the history of modernization in Japan and Turkey continue 
to interest layman and specialist alike. This is particularly true in Turkey where, 
because of Japan's dramatic victory over Russia in 1905, Japan has long been 
admired as the rising star of the East. Unfortunately, very few studies have 
attempted to compare the two countries in a serious, scholarly manner. One 
exception is, of course, Ward and Rustow's well-known study, Political moderni-
zation in Japan and Turkey, which analyzed the comparative problematic from a 
modernist perspective. Although that work examined the transfer of knowledge 
from the West in the context of political, economic, and educational moderni-
zation, it did not deal at length with the issue of the transfer of science and 
technology.' To my knowledge, the only other occasion when a systematic 
discussion of this issue took place was a brief workshop held at Bogazici 
University (Istanbul) in the early 1980s. 
   How should we compare the adoption of Western science by Japan and by 
Turkey? One would have to conclude that Japan is far more advanced than 
Turkey in terms of the assimilation of Western science. A sober reminder of this 
gap is seen in the remarkable ability of prewar Japanese scientists to develop 
Nobel-winning research in the modest conditions of a developing Asian society, 
compared with the dismal slowness of their Turkish counterparts-and this 
despite the fact that the ideal of modern science and technology was enthu-
siastically advocated. An anecdote related to me by Professor Omur Akyiiz of 
the Physics Department of Bogazici University wonderfully illustrates this stark 
contrast in the development of science in the two countries. Mehmed Akif, the 
great Turkish poet who wrote the lyrics of the national anthem and a 
veterinarian by training, visited Berlin in 1916, where Albert Einstein worked 
from 1913 to 1933. While in Berlin, Akif heard about Einstein's theory of 
relativity and his idea of the equivalence of matter and energy. Mehmed Akif 
appreciated the modern science of the day and upon his return he incorporated 
it into his poetry. In one poem, the Poet urges Asym, an imaginary young man 
(most probably his own son) and his friends to go to Europe for further 
education, especially in positive science. He explains how in Europe, 
                                 251
Selcuk ESENBEL
They seek the "Corpuscular Power of matter." 
Wishing to harness this remarkable power. 
Number of heads spend thousands of effort 
For, from one drop of substance, they'll extract, 
Not millions of but endless power.'
   As Akyuz comments, this was before 1920. Yet in his view no one seems to 
have followed up on the hint. The study of relativity and quantum physics were 
not mentioned seriously in Turkey until 1942, and appeared as regular 
university courses only in the 1950s. The first Turk to receive a Ph. D in physics 
(Sorbonne, 1926), Fahir Emin [Yenicay], never bothered to teach the 
fundamentals of modern physics for a long time. By contrast, Akyuz explains, a 
young Japanese electrical engineer, Nishina Yoshio, visited Europe in the 1920s, 
attracted by modern theoretical physics, and before 1930 had engaged in the 
first application of relativistic quantum physics. Upon his return to Japan, 
Nishina gathered a group of young and able students, and initiated them to 
modern theoretical physics. Two of them, Yukawa Hideki and Tomonaga 
Shin'ichiro, would win Nobel Prizes for their revolutionary work. 
   How can this radically different encounter with modern science and 
technology in Japan and Turkey be explained? One key factor harming 
Ottoman efforts was its heavy burden of defense expenditure. In what might be 
described as a "war orientation", the Ottoman poured huge amounts of capital 
into holding its far-flung empire together militarily. By contrast, Tokugawa 
Japan prospered economically despite the continued existence of feudal 
boundaries and military rule.3 Tokugawa Japan was in essence a demilitarized 
population of mostly peasants. Hence, although Japanese domainal lords and the 
Shogun faced occasional peasant uprisings, these uprisings rarely presented the 
degree of military danger that the ethnic and political rebellion of armed leaders 
in the Balkans, or the clash of powerful imperial armies such as the Hapsburgs 
and the Romanovs presented to the Ottomans. In other words, the Ottoman style 
of empire building dictated the need for a costly military infrastructure. Large 
portions of Ottoman resources were drained by defense. In Japan, on the other 
hand, while the military aristocracy was an unusually high proportion of the 
population-close to 10 percent in some areas (in contrast with the usual 2-4 
percent of most monarchical orders)-the Japanese samurai managed with the 
sword as the principal weapon to keep order in a society of peasants prone to 
discontent due to high taxes. All in all, Tokugawa Japan was a society at peace. 
   In short, an important factor in Japan's acquisition of Western science was
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the strong material foundation of Tokugawa Japan. Tokugawa Japan's robust 
economy can be seen in its rich urban culture. Edo, the center of the Tokugawa 
national government, grew to a city of one million. The urbanization of the 
aristocracy went hand-in-hand with the flourishing of a sophisticated urban 
culture of leisure in which samurai and wealthy merchants enjoyed the 
pleasures of the floating world-in poetry, theater, and the erotic amusements of 
the courtesan quarters. The Tokugawa era witnessed sustained economic and 
population growth, the rise of a small elite of wealthy commoners, the foun-
dation of a productive economy of rice agriculture, and healthy domestic trade. 
As T. C. Smith masterfully argues in his work, The agrarian origins of modern 
Japan, the wealth of the Tokugawa cities, the surplus of its villages, and the 
enterprising spirit of its wealthy commoners formed the foundation of modern 
Japanese capitalism in the 19t' century, once the Meiji regime adopted a 
conscious policy of modernization.' 
   This raises the next fundamental contrast in the historical circumstances of 
these two countries : the challenge of implementing new policies on a national 
level. The Ottoman Empire was an amalgam of territories covering a 
subcontinent, and encompassing complex populations that were distinct in 
every sense (linguistically, religiously, culturally). Japan, on the other hand, an 
island nation, had a well-integrated population which shared a common cultural 
identity, evident in language and in cultural praxis. While executing self-
conscious shifts in national direction (as during the Meiji period, 1868-1912) was 
by no means simple, such dramatic changes in national orientation were much 
more plausible in Japan than in the decentralized, sometimes fragmented 
Ottoman state. 
   In addition to these differences was the West's very different attitude 
towards Turkey and Japan, especially during the 19t' and early 20th centuries. 
During the 19th century an important measure of political power was the 
possession of territory. To the expanding powers of the West, Japan was a poor 
prize. It was, after all, but a small, mountainous island with meager natural 
resources. The Ottoman Empire, on the other hand, was land rich and presented 
a rich trophy for expanding nation-states. This relative lack of Western interest 
in Japan, combined with Japan's rapid adoption of Western legal and political 
structures, insulated Japan to an important degree from the rapaciousness of 19th 
century imperialism. 
   I propose at this point to pause and rethink the. entire narrative of this 
comparison. Where does the secret, if any, lie in the emergence of modern Japan 
after 1868 into the world of the Great Powers, while the Ottomans by that time 
came to be known as the Sick Man of Europe? I believe that more than anything
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else it was the special circumstances of the Meiji era, which made the qualitative 
difference in the history of reform. This difference facilitated Japan's 
assimilation of science and technology, the so-called nerve center of modernity. 
Granted, the Tokugawa heritage was important, but I differ from the recent 
fascination with Tokugawa data as the source of all that was modern in Meiji 
Japan. Instead, I would emphasize the psychology of the early Meiji generation 
of leaders. Their boldness enabled a radical and total campaign of reform and 
adoption of Western civilization, thus quickening the birth of modern Japan, in 
contrast to the piecemeal style of Japan's early modern rulers. The old and new 
were not allowed to coexist in modern Meiji Japan : the old was forced to revise 
itself in terms of the new. In the wake of establishing a national secondary 
school system, the traditional schools were abolished. Even the dress of 
traditional Japan, the kimono, was reformed to fit Western forms of propriety.5 
The radicalness of the Meiji reform quest compares in spirit to the radicalness 
and iconoclasm of the Turkish Republican Revolution after 1923 under Mustafa 
Kemal Atattirk. 
   In no sphere is this more apparent than in the realm of diplomacy. For the 
191'' century elite of Meiji Japan and Ottoman Turkey, the revision of the unequal 
treaties was a common diplomatic goal that informed their respective policies. 
Yet, because of the strong ambitions of Western imperialists in the Near East and 
in the Balkans, Ottoman bureaucrats endured stifling conditions of diplomacy. 
By contrast, because Japan existed on the periphery of Western ambitions and 
never became the primary object of imperialist design, Japanese diplomats for 
the most part avoided the problems encountered by Ottoman officials. 
   Each act of reform in Meiji Japan was designed to realize the aim of treaty 
revision. Meiji leaders were obsessed with this goal. The cosmopolitan Otto-
mans sometimes resigned themselves to the immediate impossibility of the 
situation, and simply searched for spheres of maneuverability within the 
restrictions of the treaty system. The Meiji public as well as the decision-
makers, on the other hand, had treaty revision and only treaty revision as the 
first priority in their reform program, known by its four slogans of military 
strengthening, economic prosperity, civilization, and enlightenment. 
   This comparison, therefore, brings us to the question of global conditions as 
they affect any society in its quest for reform, especially when it contains the 
policy of importing science and technology. While the Ottomans were trying to 
balance power in their relations with the West (the homeland of modern science 
and technology), their diplomacy did help improve relations with France and 
England to the point of gaining some help in setting up modern civilian, military, 
and financial institutions. But toward the end of the 19th century, one senses a
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cooling of relations between the Ottomans and the British due to their clash of 
national interests and the overtures of the Ottomans to Germany. In contrast, 
the Meiji leaders who had the advantage of not being a primary objective of 
imperialist design by any Western power, were brilliant in their diplomatic 
policy of moving closer to Great Britain and finally convincing this 19th century 
superpower to revise the unequal treaties in 1895. In 1902, Japan formed a 
staunch alliance with England as expressed in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. 
   In narrating the history of reform in this the age, the diplomatic successes of 
the Meiji leadership cannot be overemphasized. Whether one likes it or not, 
knowledge is power, and diplomacy has played a decisive role in the history of 
the transfer of knowledge from one civilization to another. A roster of the 
foreign advisors who served Meiji Japan shows the strength of Anglo-Saxon 
education, science, and technology. Meiji Japan was officially accepted in 1902 
by the great powers as a European-type nation with no legal compromises. This 
was a tremendous diplomatic victory as well as national turning point for Japan, 
for it gave Japan access to the full knowledge of the industrial societies of the 
age. 
   Again, with respect to the diplomatic context of the history of science and 
technology, one can also argue that compared to its relations with Japan, 
Western ties to the Europeanized Ottoman polity of the 19th century gradually 
became cooler. The last strong-willed Sultan, Abdulhamid II, viewed himself as 
a rival in the imperialist game of Pan-Islamism, and opposed Western interests 
in order to protect the empire from its ambitions. By contrast, until the rise of an 
aggressive form of Japanese nationalism at the end of the Russo-Japanese War 
of 1905, Westerners residing in Tokyo during the Meiji era reflected the general 
Western enthusiasm for modern Japan. With the interesting exception of Pierre 
Loti, who loved the Ottomans and disliked the Japanese, Western public opinion 
did not see the modernizing Japanese as part of a dangerous oriental "yellow 
peril" but rather as a charming people whose efforts at modernization were 
remarkably admirable. Reading the diaries of such Western participants in the 
Meiji experience of reform, such as Lafcadio Hearn and Basil Chamberlain, one 
sees that the modern Japanese and some of their Western sympathizers were 
acting almost as partners in this quest for modernity. The Westerners who were 
involved in the project of Westernizing, Christianizing, and modernizing Japan 
may have been at times overbearing, but they were involved sincerely. The 
Ottoman elite lacked the flexibility of the Japanese in their approach toward 
Western missionary zeal. One could hardly imagine an Ottoman minister 
allowing some Muslims to convert to Christianity in order to improve relations 
with the West, and gain Western help for reform. Yet the young minister of
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education, Mori Arinori, who was educated in the United States, and is known as 
the founder of modern national education in Japan, argued in favor of allowing 
some Japanese to convert to Christianity as a means of gaining Western favor.' 
The history of European Christendom and that of the Ottomans as the Sword of 
Islam simply wouldn't allow such a flexible approach to religion, merely for the 
sake of modern knowledge. Moreover, the historical rivalry between Chris-
tianity and Islam presented a very different psychological environment from the 
Buddhist and the Shinto animistic heritage of Japan, one that did not pose an 
immediate threat to Westerners. 
   In diplomatic terms, one could top this discussion with the suggestion that 
by the end of the 19th century the Ottomans, who used to be a close ally of Great 
Britain in her foreign policy against Russia, were now replaced by the militarily 
promising Meiji Japanese, who were to prove worthy of the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance of 1902 by defeating Russian interests. As the new Star of the East, 
Japan was to enjoy British favor until the late 1920s, a fact that surely helped the 
development of education and science in Japan. 
   Finally, piecemeal reform in Ottoman education seems to have provoked the 
emergence of rival social and cultural elites that used the slogan of religion 
versus modernity in order to legitimize their political claims to power. This 
appears to be a fate that Meiji Japan largely avoided. In terms of the political 
stability so critical to reforms, the antagonism between the strong-willed 
Ottoman Sultan Abdulhamid II (r. 1876-1908) and radical reformers like the 
Young Turks seems to have cracked the political integrity of the top elite. The 
Young Turks, late 19th century Ottoman reformers with a strong nationalist 
agenda, resembled the Meiji leaders in spirit. This rivalry for power ultimately 
led to the Young Turk Revolution of 1908. By contrast, the relationship between 
the Meiji Emperor, who did not exercise strong power but was a unique symbol 
of religious and political unity, and the reformist elites, who held the reins of 
power in their hand as imperial bureaucrats, was much less hostile. 
   Furthermore, the Meiji elite emphasized the development of a modern 
economy, and this required modern science and technology. By the end of the 
19th century, then, Japan had built up a modern sector in its traditional economy 
which was export oriented, based on the latest technology of mass manu-
facturing for such large markets as the United States and China. This appears 
lacking in the Ottoman case, whose modern sectors of manufacturing exhibit 
small-scale production of a peripheral character integrated with European trade. 
   In conclusion, comparison of the history of science and technology in Japan 
and Turkey reveals the complex layering of historical conditions that influence 
the behavior of nations, rather than proving the similarities or differences
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between Japan and Turkey. If there is a lesson to be learned, it is this : history is 
not a moral book of lessons. Instead, we must contemplate a wide range of 
historical factors influencing the quest for science and technology in the 
formation of a new world. 
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